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THE MODAL LOGIC OF REVERSE MATHEMATICS
CARL MUMMERT, ALAEDDINE SAADAOUI, AND SEAN SOVINE
Abstract. The implication relationship between subsystems in Reverse Mathe-
matics has an underlying logic, which can be used to deduce certain new Reverse
Mathematics results from existing ones in a routine way. We use techniques of
modal logic to formalize the logic of Reverse Mathematics into a system that
we name s-logic. We argue that s-logic captures precisely the “logical” content
of the implication and nonimplication relations between subsystems in Reverse
Mathematics. We present a sound, complete, decidable, and compact tableau-
style deductive system for s-logic, and explore in detail two fragments that are
particularly relevant to Reverse Mathematics practice and automated theorem
proving of Reverse Mathematics results.
1. Introduction
Reverse Mathematics is a research area in mathematical logic focusing on rela-
tionships between subsystems of second-order arithmetic [8]. Here a subsystem is
simply a consistent theory in the language L2 of second order arithmetic. In a typ-
ical result, a researcher focuses on two subsystems S and T , each of which is rich
enough to include a standard base system of axioms. The goal of the research is to
show that the subsystem S implies the subsystem T (that is, every L2-structure that
satisfies S also satisfies T ) or that the subsystem S does not imply a subsystem T
(there is an L2-structure that satisfies S but does not satisfy T ). As usual, if S and
T are subsystems of second order arithmetic, we write S ⊢ T if every L2-structure
that satisfies S also satisfies T , and S 0 T if there is an L2-structure that satisfies
S but does not satisfy T . Because the completeness theorem for first-order logic
applies to second-order arithmetic, it would be equivalent to write S  T .
To study the ⊢ and 0 relations from a purely logical viewpoint, we will employ
a formal strict implication symbol J and its formal negation, 6J. We consider a
logic, which we call s-logic, whose formulas are of the forms A J B and A 6J B,
where A and B are formulas of propositional logic. In an intended interpretation
of a formula of s-logic, the propositional variables are assigned to subsystems of
second-order arithmetic, J is interpreted as ⊢, and 6J is interpreted as 0. Our goal is
to study the logic of such formulas, giving a sound and complete deductive system
and establishing compactness and decidability theorems.
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There has been a significant amount of previous research on the strict impli-
cation operator, J. This research was initiated by Lewis [5, 6] and continued by
many others including Barcan [1] and Hacking [4] before being subsumed into the
general theory of modal logic. The most common contemporary approach, which
we also follow, treats A J B as an abbreviation for the modal formula (A → B).
We have not found previous research that treats precisely the fragment of modal
logic necessary for Reverse Mathematics, however. We are interested in formulas
of both forms A J B and A 6J B, not only formulas for the first form, as some
authors have been. But we are not interested in formulas with nested strict impli-
cations, such as A J (B J C), as other authors have been. If we interpret J as
⊢ in a formula of that sort, the inner strict implication must be replaced by a for-
malized provability predicate, and we would arrive at a provability logic somewhat
related to the one studied by Solovay [9]. We are interested only in the logic of the
actual provability relation, ⊢, and thus we wish to avoid formulas in which strict
implications and nonimplications are nested.
Although our motivation for studying s-logic comes from Reverse Mathematics,
s-logic may also be applied to other areas of mathematics. As a concrete example,
one could identify propositional variables with properties that an arbitrary topolog-
ical space may possess, interpret S J T to mean that every space with property
S has property T , and interpret S 6J T to mean there is a space with property S
that does not have property T . The logic corresponding to this topological inter-
pretation of J and 6J will be the same as the logic for the Reverse Mathematics
interpretation. It is easy to think of additional interpretations for which the same
logic is obtained.
One intended application of our research is in automated theorem proving of
Reverse Mathematics results. While many Reverse Mathematics results require
original arguments, there are other results implicit in the literature that are obtained
by routine combination of results from several papers. Thus, as the volume of re-
search in Reverse Mathematics continues to increase, it can be tedious to determine
whether a particular question has been implicitly resolved. A website known as the
Reverse Mathematics Zoo, maintained by Damir D. Dzhafarov, contains a list of
many Reverse Mathematics results from the literature, and uses these to automat-
ically deduce some of the additional Reverse Mathematics results implicit in the
known ones. We hope that a more complete understanding of the underlying logic
will help the development of such systems. The results of the final section, in par-
ticular, deal with fragments of s-logic that are relevant to automated analysis of the
Reverse Mathematics literature.
The research presented here was initiated by the third author in an undergraduate
research project and continued by the second author as a master’s thesis. The
first author supervised both of these projects. The first and second authors then
extended the results to their present form.
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2. Reverse mathematics, modal logic, and s-logic
In this section, we present and justify the syntax and semantics of s-logic, and
establish a semantic compactness theorem. The syntax begins with a choice of an
alphabet of propositional variables. In our intended interpretations, each proposi-
tional variable will represent a subsystem of second-order arithmetic.
Definition 1. A signature for s-logic consists of a infinite (possibly uncountable)
set Σ of propositional variables along with the non-variable symbols ‘(’, ‘)’, ‘∧’,
‘∨’, ‘→’, ‘¬’, ‘J’, and ‘6J’.
For the remainder of the paper, we will assume that some particular signature
has been fixed.
Definition 2 (s-formulas). The propositional formulas are the smallest set of for-
mulas such that:
(1) Each propositional variable is a propositional formula.
(2) If A is a propositional formula, so is ¬A.
(3) If A and B are propositional formulas, so are (A∧B), (A∨B), and (A → B).
An s-formula is of the form A J B or A 6J B, where A and B are propositional
formulas. A formula of the form A J B is a strict implication, while a formula
of the form A 6J B is a strict nonimplication. An s-theory is an arbitrary set of
s-formulas.
To motivate our choice of semantics, consider an L2-structure M. If each propo-
sitional variable is associated with a subsystem, we may form a valuation wM : Σ→
{T, F} by putting wM(X) = T if and only if M  X. Of course, if X ⊢ Y , then M will
satisfy X → Y . But, if X 0 Y , a particular L2 structure M might still satisfy X → Y .
In particular, all the subsystems normally considered in Reverse Mathematics are
true in the standard model of second-order arithmetic. In general, to have valua-
tions that witness the consistency of strict nonimplications, we will need to look at
a semantics that uses sets of valuations, which we call frames.
If M is a set of L2-structures, we may form the associated frame {wM : M ∈ M}.
Under the definitions we will give, this frame will satisfy an s-formula A J B if
every structure in M satisfies A → B, and will satisfy A 6J B if there is a structure
in M that satisfies A and does not satisfy B. Frames of this kind, which are arise
from sets of L2-structures, are the intended interpretations of s-logic.
Our goal, however, is to reason in a logical manner about the relationships be-
tween subsystems, in a way that is compatible with our limited knowledge at each
moment of time. At each moment, a researcher knows about a particular set of
L2-structures, but does not know about all L2-structures. Moreover, for each L2-
structure M that has been studied, the researcher knows the truth values within M
of particular subsystems, but does not know the truth values of all subsystems. For
example, there are some subsystems whose consistency is an open problem. If X
is such a subsystem, the researcher must consider for the sake of logical analysis
both valuations that make X true and ones which make X false, as long as these
valuations are consistent with all other known results. This analysis leads to a very
general semantics for s-logic, with a constructive character.
4 CARL MUMMERT, ALAEDDINE SAADAOUI, AND SEAN SOVINE
Definition 3 (Valuations and frames). A valuation is a function from the set of
propositional variables to the set {T, F}. As usual, each valuation can be extended
uniquely to a valuation that assigns a truth value to each propositional formula.
A frame is a nonempty set of valuations. A strict implication A J B is satisfied
by a frame R if, for every valuation w ∈ R, w(A → B) = T . This is equivalent to:
for every w ∈ R, either w(A) = F or w(B) = T . A strict nonimplication A 6J B
is satisfied by R if there is at least one valuation w ∈ R such that w(A) = T and
w(B) = F. A frame satisfies an s-theory Γ if every formula in Γ is satisfied by the
frame.
The semantics for s-logic uses all possible frames. Although the intended in-
terpretation of J is ⊢, they differ in important ways when arbitrary frames are
considered. For example, if each propositional variable from a fixed alphabet is
associated with a subsystem of second-order arithmetic, and a frame R satisfies a
given set Γ of s-formulas on that alphabet, there may not be a set of L2-structures
M with R = RM, because there may be relationships between the subsystems that
are not stated in Γ. For example, if A and B are subsystems such that A ⊢ B, then
every frame of the form RM satisfies A J B; but Γ may not contain A J B and R
may not satisfy that formula. Similarly, if A and B are subsystems such that A 0 B,
a frame of the form RM will satisfy A 6J B if and only if there is an L2-structure in
M that satisfies A and does not satisfy B.
These differences are to be expected. If we translate several Reverse Mathemat-
ics results into a set of s-formulas, and then formally derive consequences from
these formulas, we cannot expect to derive all possible Reverse Mathematics re-
sults, but only the ones that can be proven by looking at the logical structure of
formulas, without considering the meanings of the propositional variables within
them. In other words, we only expect to formally derive new formulas that are, in a
sense, routine combinations of existing formulas. Similarly, if we begin with only
a fixed collection of L2-structures, M, we cannot expect to use formal methods of
s-logic to derive the existence of a new L2-structure. Thus we expect that, when we
define a deductive system for s-logic, if an s-formula A 6J B can be derived from
a set of s-formulas Γ, then among any collection of L2 structures M for which RM
satisfies Γ, at least one of the structures in M must satisfy A and not satisfy B.
2.1. Relationship with modal logic. Although the motivation for our semantics
does not directly come from modal logic, our definition of a frame can be viewed
as a slight modification of Kripke semantics in modal logic. Under our semantics,
an s-formula A J B corresponds exactly to the modal (A → B), where φ holds
in a frame if and only if φ holds in all valuations of the frame. However, because
we are not interested in formulas with nested modal operators, we have no need
for an accessibility relation in our definition, and we do not require the full forcing
relation . For readers accustomed to modal logic, our system can be viewed as
analogous to a fragment of S5, in that a strict implication or strict nonimplication
is “visible” from every world (valuation) in the frame.
We could thus employ a general deductive system for modal logic (such as S5)
to study s-logic. There are several disadvantages to that approach, which lead us
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to reject it. The first is that we look for a deductive system whose intensional as-
pects match the intended interpretation more closely. A proof in S5 may require
significant reinterpretation to be read as a result of reverse mathematics, but the de-
ductive systems we will present match the intension of the intended interpretation,
so that a proof in these systems is easily read as a proof in the usual style of Re-
verse Mathematics. The second disadvantage is that general modal logic includes
formulas with nested modal operations, such as (A → (¬B)). Such formulas
have no place in the intended interpretation, because we seek to interpret J as the
actual provability relation, not as a formalized provability relation.
2.2. Compactness of s-logic. In the next section we will establish a sound and
complete deductive system for s-logic. As a preliminary result, we first establish a
semantic compactness theorem which will be useful in our later proofs.
Theorem 4 (Compactness). If every finite subset of an s-theory is satisfiable, then
the entire s-theory is satisfiable.
Proof. The proof uses the so-called “standard interpretation” of modal logic into
first-order logic [2]. This interpretation converts each s-formula into a first-order
formula in such a way that an s-theory is satisfiable if and only if the corresponding
first-order theory is satisfiable. The compactness theorem for s-logic then follows
immediately from the compactness theorem for first-order logic. 
The proof of the compactness theorem suggests that we could also form a deduc-
tive system for s-logic by interpreting s-logic into first-order logic. The deductive
systems for first-order logic are even farther from the intended interpretation of
s-logic, however.
3. Tableau system
Our first inference system is inspired by the system of Mints [7]. It is a refuta-
tional system in the unsigned tableau style. One motivation for this type of deriva-
tional system is that the proof (refutation) technique closely matches the way that a
researcher in Reverse Mathematics might analyze a routine combination of results.
Moreover, it is known in the automated theorem proving community that software-
generated tableaux can be effectively converted into natural-language prose proofs
of their results.
For convenience, we use a slightly different set of formulas to label the nodes
of a tableau. We first fix a world alphabet, which is an infinite set of variables that
can be used to symbolize worlds (valuations) in a hypothetical frame.
Definition 5. Let W be a fixed world alphabet. The tableau formulas consist of
all strict implication and strict nonimplication formulas, and all expressions of the
form (A, w), where A is a propositional formula and w ∈ W .
Definition 6. A tableau for a set Γ of tableau formulas is a finite tree T , with each
node labeled by a (possibly infinite) set of tableau formulas, such that the root of
T is labeled with Γ and each non-root node is obtained from its parent by one of
the tableau inference rules in Figure 1. Here, when the rule 6J is applied, v must be
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Γ, (A, w) Γ, (B, w)
∨
Γ, (A ∨ B, w)
Γ, (¬A, w), (¬B, w)
¬∨
Γ, (¬(A ∨ B), w)
Γ, (A, w), (B, w)
∧
Γ, (A ∧ B, w)
Γ, (¬A, w) Γ, (¬B, w)
¬∧
Γ, (¬(A ∧ B), w)
Γ, (¬A, w) Γ, (B, w)
→
Γ, (A → B, w)
Γ, (A, w), (¬B, w)
¬ →
Γ, (¬(A → B), w)
Γ, (¬A, w) Γ, (B, w)
J
Γ, A J B
Γ, (A, v), (¬B, v)
6J (v new)
Γ, A 6J B
Γ, (A, w) Γ, (¬A, w)
C
Γ
Γ, (A, w)
¬¬
Γ, (¬¬A, w)
Figure 1. Tableau-style inference rules
an element of W that is not mentioned in the ancestor nodes of the node where the
rule is being applied. When the rule J is applied, w may be any element of W .
A branch (path) through a tableau is closed if it contains a node for which the
label contains both (A, w) and (¬A, w) for some propositional formula A and some
w ∈ W . A tableau is closed if every maximal branch is closed.
Intuitively, the labels on each node of a tableau represent assertions about a
possible frame. A strict implication is asserted to hold in all valuations of the
frame; a strict nonimplication is asserted to hold in some, unspecified, valuation;
and a tableau formula (A, w) asserts that A holds in valuation w.
Example 7. The following diagram shows a closed tableau using the world alpha-
bet W = {w1}. The root node, at the bottom, is labeled with X 6J Y, X J A, B J
Y, A J B. Each inference is labeled with the corresponding rule from Figure 1.
For convenience, formulas on a node are not re-written on the descendants of that
node. The symbol ⊗ indicates a closed branch.
⊗
(¬X, w1)
⊗
(¬A, w1)
⊗
(B, w1)
J (¬B, w1)
⊗
(Y, w1)
J (A, w1)
J (X, w1), (¬Y, w1)
6J
X 6J Y, X J A, B J Y, A J B
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The reason that only one symbol is needed in the world alphabet in this de-
duction is that there is only one nonimplication formula listed at the root of the
tableau.
Theorem 8 (Soundness). Suppose that there is a tableau for a set Γ of s-formulas
such that every branch of Γ is closed. Then no frame can satisfy Γ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the tableau, with one case for
each of the ten tableau rules. For each rule, it can be shown directly that if a frame
R satisfies the set of formulas on the bottom of the rule, then the frame also satisfies
at least one of the sets of formulas on the top of the rule. Here, each time a new
world variable v is introduced at a particular node, v is interpreted on that node and
all of its descendants as a particular valuation wv in R, and R satisfies (A, v) if and
only if wv(A) = T . 
The hypothesis of finiteness in they following theorem is a convenience that
will be removed in Theorem 12. For applications to automated theorem proving,
the finite case is of the most interest.
Theorem 9 (Completeness). Suppose that Γ is a finite set of s-formulas such that
there is no closed tableau for Γ. Then there is a frame that satisfies Γ.
Proof. Let Γ be a finite set of s-formulas. We begin by forming a finite tableau T
such that, whenever a formula A appears on a maximal branch, the corresponding
tableau rule for A is also applied on that branch, and such that for every proposi-
tional formula A and world variable w that appears on a maximal branch, the rule C
is applied to that branch using the formula A and world variable w. Such a tableau
can be made by repeatedly applying tableau rules in a systematic way until the de-
sired conditions are met, and the resulting tableau will be finite so long as rule C is
only applied to a formula A and world variable w that already appear on a branch.
If there is no closed tableau for Γ, then in particular T does not close, so there
is at least one maximal branch B in T which is not closed. Then, for every world
variable v that appears on B, we define a valuation wv. For each propositional letter
X that appears on B, the terminal node of B contains either (X, v) or (¬X, v), by
construction. Because B is not closed, only one of these cases can occur. We let
wv(X) = T in the former case, and wv(X) = F in the latter. Let R be the frame that
contains the valuations wv for all world variables v that appear on B.
It can then be shown directly by induction from the terminal node of B back to
the root that R satisfies the bottom set of formulas in each tableau rule that was
used to form the branch B. Thus R satisfies the set of tableau formulas at the root
of B, so R satisfies Γ. 
The notation from the next definition will be used to simplify the statements of
several theorems.
Definition 10. The strict negation of a s-formula φ, denoted −φ, is defined by
cases: −(A J B) is A 6J B, and −(A 6J B) is A J B.
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Unlike the negation symbol ¬, which is part of the language of propositional
logic, strict negation is strictly a notation in the metalanguage; the symbol ‘−’ is
never part of an s-formula. The key property is that a frame satisfies an s-formula
A if and only if the frame does not satisfy −A.
We now turn to the issue of characterizing logical consequence in s-logic.
Definition 11. An s-formula A is a strict consequence of an s-theory Γ if every
frame that satisfies Γ satisfies A.
Theorem 12. An s-formula A is a strict consequence of an s-theory Γ if and only
if there is a closed tableau for Γ ∪ {−A}.
Proof. If there is a closed tableau for Γ∪{−A} then, by the soundness theorem, there
is no frame that satisfies Γ ∪ {−A}, and thus every frame that satisfies Γ satisfies A.
For the converse, suppose that every frame that satisfies Γ satisfies A. Then no
frame satisfies Γ ∪ {−A}. By the compactness theorem, this means that there is a
finite subset ∆ of Γ ∪ {−A} that is not satisfied by any frame. By the completeness
theorem, there is a closed tableau for ∆. This tableau becomes also a closed tableau
for Γ ∪ {−A} if label on the root of the tableau is changed from ∆ to Γ ∪ {−A}, with
similar changes to the remaining nodes. 
Example 13. In light of Lemma 12, the closed tableau in Example 7 shows that
A 6J B is a strict consequence of {X 6J Y, X J A, B J Y}, and also shows that
X J Y is a strict consequence of {X J A, A J B, B J Y}. In contrast, neither
B J C nor B 6J C is a strict consequence of {A J B, A J C}.
Theorem 14 (Decidability of s-logic). Let V be the set of pairs (Γ, A) where Γ is
a finite s-theory, φ is an s-formula, and φ is a strict consequence of Γ. Then, under
a standard Go¨del numbering of formulas and finite sets of formulas, the set V is
computable.
Proof. Given (Γ, φ), we may effectively form a finite tableau T for Γ ∪ {−φ}, as in
the proof of Theorem 9. If this tableau is closed, then φ is a strict consequence
of Γ. If T is not closed then, again as in the proof of Theorem 9, φ is not a strict
consequence of Γ. 
4. Two fragments
In this section, we consider two fragments of s-logic that are of particular inter-
est in the practice of Reverse Mathematics, and give short and natural deductive
systems for these fragments.
Definition 15. Suppose that a set of propositional variables has been fixed.
• F1 consists of all s-formulas of the forms X J Y and X 6J Y , where X and
Y are individual propositional variables.
• F2 consists of all s-formulas of the forms A J Y and A 6J Y , where A is a
nonempty conjunction of propositional variables and Y is a single proposi-
tional variable.
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Fragment F1 corresponds, in a sense, to the pure implicational and nonimplica-
tional part of s-logic, in which all propositional connectives have been removed.
Fragment F2 is motivated by results in Reverse Mathematics such as the theorem
that RT22 is equivalent to SRT22 +COH [3]. It is known that RT22 implies both COH
and SRT22, and their conjunction implies RT22, but neither COH nor SRT22 implies
RT22. These facts can be expressed via the following s-theory in F2:
{SRT22 ∧ COH J RT22, RT22 J SRT22, RT22 J COH,
SRT22 6J RT22, COH 6J RT22}.
Surveying the Reverse Mathematics literature shows that almost all published re-
sults on implications or nonimplications between subsystems can be translated into
s-theories in F2. It is thus worthwhile to consider abbreviated sets of inference rules
that are sound and complete for F1 and F2.
We will state sound and complete deductive systems for these fragments. Such
systems are particularly useful in automated theorem proving for enumerating the
consequences of a given s-theory. We begin with F2. For notational convenience,
if A and B are conjunctions of variables, we may write A ∧ B for the conjunction
obtained by inserting ∧ between A and B.
Definition 16. The deductive system for F2 consists of four inference rules (I),
(W), (HS), and (N). Intuitively, rule (W) allows for weakening of hypotheses and
rule (HS) is a version of the hypothetical syllogism.
I: For any propositional variable X, deduce X J X.
W: From A J Y , deduce B J Y , where B is any conjunction such that
every conjunct of A is also a conjunct of B.
HS: From X ∧ B J Y and A J X, deduce A ∧ B J Y .
N: From A 6J X, A ∧ Z J X, and A J Y for each conjunct Y of B,
deduce B 6J Z.
Each of these rules is a scheme: A and B may be replaced by arbitrary conjunc-
tions of propositional variables, while X, Y , and Z may be replaced by arbitrary
propositional variables. In rule (HS), the conjunction B may be empty.
It is straightforward to verify that the rules are sound: if a frame satisfies Γ, and
φ is derivable from Γ with the rules, then the frame satisfies φ. We next verify that
these rules give a complete deductive system for F2.
Theorem 17 (Completeness forF2). Suppose that Γ is a consistent set of s-formulas
in F2, φ is an s-formula in F2, and every frame that satisfies Γ satisfies φ. Then
there is a derivation of φ from Γ using the rules in Definition 16.
Proof. Working towards a contradiction, we assume there is no derivation of φ
from Γ with the stated rules. Because the rules are sound, we may thus assume
that Γ is closed under the rules and φ < Γ. The proof has two cases, depending on
whether φ is a strict implication or a strict nonimplication.
Case 1: φ is of the form C J Z, where C is a nonempty conjunction. It suffices
to construct a valuation wC that satisfies Γ and does not satisfy φ. To this end, we
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define a valuation
wC(X) =



T if C J X ∈ Γ,
F if C J X < Γ.
We must verify that wC satisfies every strict implication U1 ∧ · · · ∧ Uk J V in Γ.
To do so, suppose that wC(Ui) = T for all i ≤ k. Then, for each i ≤ k, we have
that C J Ui ∈ Γ. Now, by applying rules (HS) and (W) repeatedly, we may derive
C J V . For example, we may first derive C ∧ U2 ∧ · · · ∧ Uk J V via rule (HS),
then derive
U2 ∧ C ∧ U3 ∧ · · · ∧ Uk J V
via rule (W), then derive
C ∧ C ∧ U3 ∧ · · · ∧ Uk J V
via rule (HS), and continue in this way until at the end we derive C J V by
rule (W). Thus wC satisfies every strict implication in Γ.
It remains to verify that wC does not satisfy φ. For each conjunct Y of C, we
may derive C J Y by rules (I) and (W), and thus wC(Y) = T . However, because
φ < Γ, we have wC(Z) = F. Thus wC is a valuation that satisfies Γ but does not
satisfy φ ≡ C J Z. This completes the first case, because we may adjoin wC to any
frame satisfying Γ to yield a larger frame that does not satisfy Γ ∪ {φ}.
Case 2: φ is of the form C 6J Z, where C is a nonempty conjunction. We will
build a frame that satisfies Γ and which contains no valuation satisfying C 6J Z.
It is sufficient to show that for each strict nonimplication D 6J Y in Γ there is a
valuation w satisfying the strict implications of Γ in which w(D) = T , w(Y) = F,
and either w(C) = F or w(Z) = T . We may then take one such valuation for each
strict nonimplication in Γ to construct a frame satisfying Γ but not φ.
We thus fix a strict nonimplication D 6J Y in Γ. If there is any valuation satisfy-
ing Γ in which w(D) = T , w(Y) = F, and w(C) = F, we are done. Therefore, we
may safely assume that, for each conjunct U of C, every valuation w that satisfies
Γ and has w(D) = T and w(Y) = F will have w(U) = T . We claim that, under this
assumption, we have that D J U is in Γ. To see this, consider the valuation wD
defined in the same way as wC from Case 1. We have that wD satisfies every strict
implication in Γ and, for each variable X, wD(X) = T if and only if D J X is in Γ.
Because D 6J Y is in Γ, and Γ is consistent, D J Y is not in Γ, so wD(Y) = F. Thus,
under our most assumption, wD(U) must be true, which means that D J U is in Γ.
Now, consider the valuation wD∧Z . We have wD∧Z(Z) = T and wD∧Z(D) = T .
It follows from the previous paragraph that wD∧Z(C) = T as well. There are two
subcases. Subcase 1: wD∧Z(Y) = F. In this case, wD∧Z satisfies D 6J Y but does
not satisfy C 6J Z (because Z is true) and we are done. Subcase 2: wD∧Z(Y) = T .
In this subcase, we have that D ∧ Z J Y is in Γ. Because we also have D 6J Z ∈ Γ
and D J U ∈ Γ for every conjunct U of C, we may apply rule (N) to show that
C 6J Z is in Γ, which is a contradiction. 
Corollary 18. If Γ is a consistent s-theory in F2 and φ is in F2 then φ is a strict
consequence of Γ if and only if φ can be derived from Γ using the rules of Defini-
tion 16.
THE MODAL LOGIC OF REVERSE MATHEMATICS 11
We now turn to fragment F1. The inference rules for this fragment are simplified
versions of the rules for F2. Because hypotheses of s-formulas in F1 are simply
propositional variables, the weakening rule (W) is no longer necessary.
Definition 19. The deductive system for F1 consists of the following three rules
(I), (HS), and (N):
I: For any propositional variable X, deduce X J X.
HS: From X J Y and Y J Z, deduce X J Z.
N: From X 6J Y , X J W , and Z J Y , deduce W 6J Z.
In each of these rules, W , X, Y , and Z may be replaced with arbitrary propositional
variables.
It is straightforward to verify that these rules are sound. The completness proof
is parallel to the one for F2.
Theorem 20 (Completeness forF1). Suppose that Γ is a consistent set of s-formulas
in F1, φ is an s-formula in F1, and every frame that satisfies Γ satisfies φ. Then
there is a derivation of φ from Γ using the rules in Definition 19.
Proof. The proof is parallel to the proof of Theorem 17. As before, we assume that
Γ is closed under the deduction rules and φ < Γ. The proof again divides into two
cases. The first case, when φ is a strict implication, is extremely similar to the first
case of Theorem 17.
For the second case, it is sufficient to show that whenever W 6J Z < Γ and
X 6J Y ∈ Γ, there is a valuation satisfying all strict implications in Γ, and satisfying
X 6J Y , in which W is false or Z is true. We may assume without loss of generality
that every valuation that satisfies the strict implications in Γ and also satisfies X 6J Y
must satisfy W . Then, defining the valuation wX as in Case 1 of Theorem 17, we
see that wX(W) = T , and thus X J W is in Γ.
Now consider the following valuation:
wX,Z(U) =



T if X J U ∈ Γ or Z J U ∈ Γ,
F otherwise.
We first verify that wX,Z satisfies each strict implication U J V in Γ. If wX,Z(U) =
T , then either X J U ∈ Γ or Z J U ∈ Γ. Then, because Γ is closed under rule
(HS), we have X J V or Z J V is in Γ, respectively. Thus wX,Z(U → V) = T , as
desired. Hence wX,Z satisfies all strict implications in Γ.
Now we have wX,Z(X) = T , wX,Z(Z) = T , and wX,Z(W) = T because X J W ∈ Γ.
If wX,Z(Y) = F then we are done. We show that this must happen by assuming that
wX,Z(Y) = T . Then either X J Y ∈ Γ or Z J Y ∈ Γ. The former is impossible
because X 6J Y ∈ Γ and Γ is consistent. Thus Z J Y ∈ Γ. But we also have
X 6J Y ∈ Γ and X J W ∈ Γ, so we may derive W 6J Z ∈ Γ by rule (N). This is a
contradiction. Subcase 2: wX,Z(Y) = F. Then wX,Z is the desired valuation. 
Corollary 21. If Γ is a consistent s-theory in F1 and φ is in F1 then φ is a strict
consequence of Γ if and only if φ can be derived from Γ using the rules of Defini-
tion 19.
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